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White: Criminal Law--Description of Money in a Robbery Indictment
RECENT CASE COMMENTS

had no alternative but to follow the mandate of the statute. It
intimated that it was not concerned with what recognition other
courts may give the decree in the principal case.
It is submitted that the validity of the decree and recognition
other courts may give the decree is of grave importance. The better rule, as recognized by the Restatement, is that domicil within
the territorial limits is essential to the jurisdiction of the court.
This the West Virginia statute disregards. The situation would
become more confused should a court of P state declare the parties
married despite the West Virginia decree.
-JOHN L. DETCH.

CRIam AL LAW -

DESCRIPTION OF MONEY IN A ROBBERY INDefendants were convicted of robbery and brought
error, alleging that the indictment insufficiently described the subject matter of the crime as, "certain bank notes, the description
and denomination thereof being unlmown to said grand jurors,
of the value of eight hundred dollars." The indictment was sustained and the conviction affirmed. State v. Fuiks.2
DICTMENT. -

2
This decision reaches a very practical and desirable result.

It means that the defendant cannot defeat justice on a mere
technicality, which does not infringe on his privilege of being,
"fully and plainly informed of the character and cause of the
accusation." ' The same court has recently said that an indictment should be sufficiently descriptive to enable the court to determine that the property is the subject of larceny, to advise the defendant with reasonable certainty of the charge against him, and
to enable the accused to plead the judgment rendered thereon in
bar of a later prosecution. 4 As a practical matter, the description
in the present case clearly fulfills all the requirements of the rule.
Under the cases, moreover, the decision is strengthened by the
averment that a more particular description was unknown to the
grand jury. There is a general rule, founded on necessity, that
1173 S.B. 888 (W. Va. 1934).
2 Wood v. State, 98 F a. 703, 124 So. 44 (1929). A similar result is frequently reached by statute. Roach v. State, 46 Okla. Crim. 85, 287 Pac. 1095
(1930); Criglow v. State, 183 Ark. 407, 36 S.W. (2d) 400 (1931); Rowan
v. People, 93 Colo. 473, 26 Pac. (2d) 1066 (1933), followed by Carson v.
People, 93 Colo. 478, 26 Pae. (2d) 1068 (1933). Note (1911) 34 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 301.
3W. Va. Const., art. 3, § 14.
4 State v. Robinson, 106 W. Va. 276, 145 S.E. 383 (1928).
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facts not essential to the accusation and constituting merely description may be omitted by the grand jury when it is unable to
obtain greater precision. The present case, however, holds, "actual
knowledge of the grand jury must appear". This holding goes
beyond the general rule, which requires the grand jury to make
a reasonable effort to discover a better description2 In the principal case the prosecuting witness appeared at the trial and gave a
detailed description of the money. He had previously appeared
before the grand jury, where he presumably could have given
equally definite information. Yet the state ws not required to
obtain these facts for the accused. Thus a logical application of
the rule can lead to the absurd result that a defendant is entitled
to a complete description, but only when the grand jury cares to
obtain it. In effect, his rights may be measured by the industry of
that jury.
The present decision, delivered by the same judge, distinguishes the much discussed case of State v. Robison,6 which held
an indictment for the larceny of "thirty-five hundred dollars
($3,500.00)" bad on demurrer because of insufficiency in the
description, largely on the difference between the crimes of larceny
and robbery - the latter involving force and fear as its chief
elements.7 Although such a distinction be admitted it is difficult
to see why this aggravated larceny requires a less complete
description of money than simple larceny.
The holding seems
rather extreme in view of some early dicta s and the fact that the
same court has frequently relieved minor mistakes of form 9 The
(2d ed. 1913) 449.
0 109 W. Va. 561, 155 S. E. 649 (1930); Notes (1931) 37 W. VA. L.
G 2 BisHoP's NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Q.

209 and (1931) 34 LAW NOTES 203; (1931) 11 B. U. L. Rev. 269.
7 State v. McAllister, 65 W. Va. 97, 63 S. E. 758 (1908).
8 See State v. Hurst, 11 W. Va. 54, 65 (1872) ("Notes circulating as currency which have been stolen, not being presumed to be in the possession of
the prosecutor, and it being from their nature, difficult, if not impossible,
for the prosecutor to give as accurate and minute description of them
as he could give of other articles stolen from him, a less minute and
accurate description of them has been permitted than of other articles stolen."
Because the nature of stolen money "makes detailed description difficult
the courts have been more liberal in permitting a general description of
currency, either coin or circulating notes, than of other articles of stolen
property.") ; State v. Jackson, 26 W. Va. 250, 253 (1885) (Robbery indictment for "silver coin of the value of $2.00 . . .
the description of the
coin would have been sufficient in an indictment for larceny".)
9 CODE 62-2-10 and 11; State v. MeMillion,, 104 W. Va. 1, 138 S. E. 732
(1927) (omission of date); State v. Ball, 30 W. Va. 382, 4 S. E. 645 (1887)
(change of date); State v. Vest, 21 W. Va. 796 (1883) (interlineation);
State v. Gilmore, 9 W. Va. 641 (1876) and State v. Rudy, 98 W. Va. 444,
127 S. E. 190 (1925) (clerical error); State v. Halida, 28 W. Va. 499 (1886)
(indictment containing many mistakes in grammar and spelling but mean-

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol41/iss1/13

2

White: Criminal Law--Description of Money in a Robbery Indictment

RECENT CASP COMMENTS
Robison case had considerable support in the early decisions,10
but it is submitted that the better view supports a less technical
holding. That result, however, is usually based on a statute alThe actual result of the
lowing a more general description.1 '
present case, and the current trend away from technical precision1 2
are suggestive of a more liberal view in the matter of the sufficiency of an indictment.
-RALPH M. WHITE.

EQUITABLE DEFENFS

-

FRAUDULENT INDUCEENT. -

SFAL

RELEASE -

REPLICATION

-

In an action at law on an insurance

policy, defendant by plea set up'a sealed release. Plaintiff replied
that she had been induced to execute the release by a false representation. Defendant's objection that the plaintiff in an action at
law could not challenge a sealed instrument for fraudulent inducement was rejected. Workman v. Continental Casualty Co.'
The peculiar sanctity attached to sealed instruments by the
common law2 precluded the defense of fraud in the inducement as
distinguished from fraud in the execution of a specialty." Apart
ing could be determined from the context), followed by State v. Rudy, supra;
State v. Alie, 82 W. Va. 601, 96 S. E. 1011 (1928) (incorrect name of deceased).
State v. Reece, 27 W. Va. 375 (1886) (incorrect name of third

party).
10

Note (1911) 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 933.

11 The following cases suggest the effect of such statutes:

Common v. State, 125 Ga. 785, 54 S. E. 692 (1906) ("twenty-seven hundred
dollars in money of the value of twenty-seven hundred dollars"); Moore
v. State, 179 Ind. 353, 101 N. E. 295 (1913) ("seven dollars and ten cents");
Hayes v. Commonwealth, 173 Ky. 188, 190 S. W. 700 (1917) ("1tho sum of
$2.50"); State v. Walker, 115 Miss. 700, 76 So. 634 (1917) ("seventy-seven
dollars and fifty cents, of the value of seventy-seven dollars and fifty
cents"); State v. McKnight, 196 N. C. 259, 145 S. E. 281 (1928) ("1$40 in
good and lawful money"); Bell v. State, 62 S. W. 567 (1901) ("lthirty-fivo
dollars in money of the value of thirty-five dollars").
12 Hardman, Stare Decisis and the Modern Trend (1926) 32 W. VA. L. 9.
163.
1175 S. E. 63 (W. Va. 1934).
2Ames, Specialty Contracts and Equitable Defenses (1895) 9 HAMv. L.
REv. 49.
3 Wright v. Campbell, 2 Post. & F. 393 (1861) 1..... The plea of fraud,
in an action on a specialty, was a kind of special plea of non est factum,
and would let in evidence of fraud in regard to the actual execution ....
but ...
. no other defense, founded on the nature of the transaction, is
available. 1'1
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